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It is no coincidence that there was unprecedented interest in childhood in the Victorian 
period. Peter Bowler has shown that Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859) 
‘converted the scientific world to evolutionism.’1 As Deborah J. Coon argues, this conversion 
instigated the revolutionary process of ‘secularizing the soul . . . repackaging it . . . as the 
“self”’, and thereby hastening the ‘birth of psychology’ in the late nineteenth century.2 
Carolyn Steedman has demonstrated that the clearest expression of the ‘interiorized self’ 
which was to replace the Christian soul is found in the idea of childhood in the nineteenth 
century.3 The emergence of a specific psychology of the child, in the protean field of Child 
Study, was therefore inevitable in the final decades of the Victorian period.4  
The same search for selfhood in childhood accounts for the proliferation of 
autobiographical accounts of the child’s interiority which followed the pioneering opening 
chapters of Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847).5 As Jonathan Loesberg asserts, 
‘[a]utobiography is self-making.’6 That so many Victorians wrote fictional and non-fictional 
autobiographies suggests that self-making was a vital process in the period. That many such 
autobiographies open with detailed accounts of childhood experience suggests that, for many 
authors, the self was made in childhood. Child psychology and its counterpart in 
autobiography flourish in the late Victorian period because to study childhood was to study 
the self in an era in which that self was newly necessary.  
Although, as this suggests, The Origin of Species had a revolutionary effect, it was not 
Darwin’s non-progressive model of evolution by natural selection, but other, progressive 
models which revolutionized Victorian culture.7 This essay will argue that Child Study and 
autobiography of childhood experience are unmistakably an invention of the non-Darwinian 
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revolution, because they both attempt to construct a specific type of selfhood. Within the 
specifically progressive evolutionary world view of the late nineteenth-century, the Christian 
soul was replaced by a psychological self which was, likewise, fundamentally progressive.  
In her analysis of the intersection between the emergent discipline of scientific Child 
Study and contemporaneous autobiographical accounts of childhood, Sally Shuttleworth 
observes, in passing, that ‘[t]he spur’ for the invention of Child Study ‘appears to have been 
evolutionary debates about language acquisition’.8 This essay will demonstrate that the 
emergence of disciplines devoted to the study of childhood during the period betrays a 
widespread effort, sustained across discourses, to formulate a specifically progressive model 
of selfhood, and that language acquisition is the ‘spur’ for this effort because it offers a clear 
line dividing the developing child from the self which is its end. In other words, the 
fascination with language acquisition in Child Study and in autobiography of childhood 
experience epitomises the non-Darwinian revolution from which both discourses emerged.   
Analyses of autobiographical work from the Victorian period have generally followed 
two major patterns which belie the significance of a progressive evolutionary model of 
childhood. Firstly, most critics focus largely on autobiographical work by men like Charles 
Darwin, John Ruskin, Thomas Carlyle, John Stuart Mill and John Henry Newman.9 Jenny 
Bavidge has argued that ‘authors of imaginative literature for children . . . [were] presumed to 
have a (childlike) insight into children’s lives of feelings, [and] to be possessed of a unique 
ability to remember back into their own childhoods’ in the period.10 Many such authors were 
women.11 To focus on the autobiographies of eminent Victorian men is therefore both to 
understate the centrality of childhood to the period’s evolutionary discourse, and to disregard 
the prevalent view that children’s authors had particular expertise in this area.  
Secondly, those critics who do discuss autobiographies of childhood experience have 
largely focused on the extent to which a Victorian ideology of childhood can be read in such 
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work.12 This essay will argue that the non-Darwinian revolution had a determining influence 
on the ideology of childhood, because it propagated that search for a progressive model of 
selfhood through which dedicated studies of childhood emerged in the late Victorian period.   
To examine the role of progressive evolutionism on the invention of Child Study, and 
on autobiography of childhood experience, and to explore the characteristics of the ideology 
of childhood proliferated through these responses to the non-Darwinian revolution, this essay 
will discuss the work of one of the most successful authors of the late Victorian period, 
Frances Hodgson Burnett, in comparison with the work of the some of the most prominent 
practitioners of Child Study, and particularly the work of its leading pioneer in Britain, James 
Sully. Burnett was a prolific author, who wrote for a range of audiences, but she was, and 
remains, celebrated primarily for her novels for children.13 As such, Burnett’s 
autobiographical account of early childhood, The One I Knew the Best of All (1893), would 
have been considered at least as significant a contribution to debates about childhood as 
comparable accounts by more distinguished contemporaries. Through his major academic 
contribution to Child Study, Studies of Childhood (1895), and, more directly, through the 
many articles he contributed to such non-specialist journals as Longman’s Magazine, Sully 
was perhaps the most effective advocate for the professionalization of Child Study in the 
Victorian period.14 
Sully’s work corroborates the suggestion that Burnett’s views would have carried 
particular authority in Victorian debates about childhood. Although the claim that ‘the grace 
of childhood may almost be said to have been discovered by the modern poet’ is, inevitably, 
substantiated with reference to Wordsworth and Blake, it is clear that, from Sully’s 
perspective, contemporary writers, including many women, have contributed work of more 
value for an evidence-based study of childhood.15 George Sand receives particular attention 
in Studies of Childhood but Sully notes, regretfully, that‘[s]ince this was written the authoress 
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of Little Lord Fauntleroy has shown us how clear and far-reaching a memory she has of her 
childish experiences.’16 Burnett’s most successful work is a metonym for her expertise. 
While, as Sully notes, ‘[t]he appearance of Darwin’s name among those who have deemed 
the child worthy of study’ gives status to the science of Child Study, the autobiographical 
work of experts like Burnett is the evidence based on which Child Study can claim to be 
scientific at all.17  
Through an analysis of Burnett’s autobiography, Sully’s discussions of contemporary 
autobiographical work by Pierre Loti and George Sand, and contemporary psychological 
studies of childhood and of selfhood, this essay will argue that the origins of child 
psychology in the revolutionary period following the publication of The Origin of Species are 
evident in the function which childhood performs, as an origin for a progressive model of 
selfhood, in autobiography and Child Study of the era. For Burnett, and for Sully and his 
peers in the field of Child Study, the remembered child is the self before language. By 
acquiring language, and using it to articulate the child’s experience, the adult resolves the 
disjunction between self and language which this Other self, the childhood self, represents. In 
other words, Child Study and Victorian autobiography present selfhood as the adult 
expression of a childhood impression of the self. Each thus informs the other to offer a model 
of selfhood in which the child is the origin to the adult self as an end.  
The implications of this model extended far beyond the individual child or self under 
scrutiny. One of the most prominent alternatives to Darwinian evolutionism in the late 
nineteenth century was the theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny; that the 
development of the child recapitulates the development of the human species. Seen through 
this dominant theoretical filter, autobiographical and psychological studies of childhood as a 
progressive development towards adulthood are commensurate with studies of evolution as 
the progressive development of the human species. The recapitulation of progressive 
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individual development in the evolution of the human species suggests that Child Study was 
invented, and autobiography revolutionised, in response to the late nineteenth-century need 
for a progressive model of evolution, in which the human species retained its place as the 
high-point and end. 
 In 1855, Anna Jameson called for a view of the self in which childhood and 
adulthood were integrated. The seemingly paradoxical model of selfhood as a ‘progressive 
whole’, proposed by Jameson, is formulated in the symbiosis between Child Study and 
autobiography from which child psychology emerged.18 The late nineteenth-century origins 
of child psychology offer a progressive model of selfhood, and thus illuminate the co-
dependence of debates about human evolution and about child development in Victorian 
culture. 
 
Autobiography and Child Study in the Victorian Period 
As Richard Coe observes, ‘[e]very authentic account of childhood of necessity relies mainly 
upon memory’.19 Of the problems this raises, ‘the reliability (or arbitrary unreliability) of 
memory’ was perhaps the most pressing for Victorian autobiographers, because of the intense 
scepticism with which memory was viewed in the psychology of the era.20 William James, 
for example, insists that ‘the object of memory is only an object imagined in the past . . . to 
which the emotion of belief adheres.’21 George Stout and Wilhelm Wundt, James’s peers in 
Britain and Germany respectively, were comparably sceptical.22 Shuttleworth has noted that 
Victorians in general were also ‘obsessed with the horror of the lie’.23 Victorian 
autobiographers were consequently required to present a convincing defence against the 
serious imputation that their work was misleading.24  
Burnett’s defence is simply to refute the premise on which the charge is based. 
Perhaps capitalising on the credibility she enjoys as a prominent children’s author, Burnett 
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declares that ‘after all the years that have passed I remember with equal distinctness the 
thoughts which were in the Small Person’s mind.’25 Whatever psychology might have 
uncovered about memory in general does not apply to Burnett’s memory, which is entirely 
reliable.  
It suits the purpose of Child Study to accept such claims. Burnett would undoubtedly 
have been among those authors who, Sully claims, have a ‘gift of sympathetic insight’ into 
the child mind.26 In 1891 Sully contributed an article about a recently published 
autobiography, Pierre Loti’s Le Roman d’un Enfant (1890), to Longman’s Magazine, in 
which he attributes to Loti the same powers of memory which Burnett will subsequently 
claim to authenticate her autobiography. Not only was the child Loti ‘subject to powerful 
impressions which . . . remained indelibly graven on the memory’.27 The narrative actually 
‘surpasses in retrospective reach all other records of childish experience’ (p. 202).  
As in Studies of Childhood, Sully invokes Darwin’s name to lend scientific authority 
to such claims.28 He points to the parallel between Loti’s claim that ‘the welling up of new 
childish emotion . . . causes the image of the moment to penetrate into the very texture of the 
mind, never to be dislodged’, with the fact that ‘Darwin tells us that he preserved to the end a 
picture of the exact aspect of the old tree or bank where, as a Cambridge undergraduate, he 
made a good capture of beetles’ to validate the assertion that Loti has ‘photographic 
registration of sense impressions’ (p. 205). According to Sully’s analysis, in Le Roman d’un 
Enfant Loti has offered the reader photographic, indelible and exceptionally early memories 
of childhood experience. For Sully as for Burnett, the charge of falsity or fictionality simply 
does not apply to the autobiographical memories of that select group of adults who retain a 
rare degree of identification with their childhood selves. Victorian psychologists are only 
lately beginning to receive recognition for their influence on Sigmund Freud. Without 
wishing to perpetuate the view that Freud’s work had no antecedents, the idea that anyone’s 
7 
 
mental processes are entirely reliable seems distinctly pre-Freudian, and unsustainable after 
Freud.  
A second charge is less easily deflected, even before Freud, than the accusation of 
autobiographical deceitfulness. Coe claims that ‘if there is any value in childhood experience, 
it lies in the fact that this experience is unique.’29 If this had been the Victorian view, 
autobiographers of early childhood experience would have been unavoidably susceptible to 
the accusation of what Loesberg calls ‘a morbid, debilitating overinvolvement with self’.30 
However, Victorian autobiographies of childhood experience were valuable largely insofar as 
that experience was not unique. Shuttleworth notes that ‘the representative quality of the 
individual portrait’ lends scientific authority to autobiography, in a fundamentally symbiotic 
relationship where Child Study, reciprocally, can use autobiographical memories of an 
individual’s childhood experience as evidence for claims about the child mind in general.31 
This role in scientific study also enables the authors of autobiography of childhood 
experience to circumvent the accusation of self-obsession.  
Thus, Burnett’s autobiography is presented as ‘an attempt to understand the working 
of the child mind by studying one particular example in detail’,32 but this is not only, or even 
primarily, to invest her work with scientific authority. Indeed, when Burnett claims that ‘I 
might fairly entitle [the autobiography] “The Story of Any Child with an Imagination”’, she 
does so to insist that she is accordingly ‘absolved from any charge of the bad taste of 
personality’ (p. vii). Burnett’s autobiography is not a testament to the uniqueness of her 
childhood experience, and consequently to her debilitating obsession with herself. It is, 
instead, a source of enabling insight into the child we all once were.  
Burnett’s claim that her self-portrait is representative deflects the charge of 
‘personality’, but, once again, such claims also suit the purposes of Child Study. Sully asserts 
that the mind uncovered in Loti’s autobiography might be that of any child: Loti has, ‘the true 
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feeling’ not just for his own ‘child-nature’ but ‘for child-nature’ itself, and ‘its original way of 
envisaging things’ (p. 200). Likewise, although Sully’s review of George Sand’s 
autobiographical Histoire de ma Vie (1855) opens with the admission that ‘[t]he reader need 
not be told that the child who was to become the representative among modern women of the 
daring irregularities of genius was an uncommon child’, ‘close inspection shows that the 
untamed and untameable “oddities” were, after all, only certain common childish impulses 
and tendencies exalted, or, if the reader prefers, exaggerated.’33  
Sully’s analyses of autobiographical accounts of Sand’s childhood experiences can 
consequently be reproduced in his seminal contribution to the study of the child mind itself. 
Although ‘[t]he early recollections of George Sand’, which Sully summarises in ‘A Girl’s 
Religion’ (1890), ‘furnish what is probably the most remarkable instance of childish daring in 
fashioning a new religion’, this account forms the basis and main evidence for Sully’s 
analysis of children’s religious beliefs in general in Studies of Childhood.34 In the latter text, 
Sand’s experiences illustrate, ‘no doubt, a true childish aspiration towards the great Unseen, 
and also an impulse to invent a form of worship which should harmonise with and express the 
little worshipper’s individual thoughts’.35  
In short, then, ‘the gifted child seems not less but more of a child because of his 
gifts.’36 Exceptionally intense childhood experience—which Loti, Sand and Burnett all claim 
to have had—paradoxically epitomises childhood experience itself, and, conveniently, also 
leaves an indelible trace on the adult’s memory. The claims of Sully’s Child Study are 
validated because they are based on the testimony of authors who are both are extraordinarily 
able to recollect childhood, and representative in the experiences they had. Through this 
symbiosis with scientific discourse, the same authors circumvent many of the charges to 




The Content of Children’s Minds 
The reciprocity between an emergent autobiography of childhood experience and the newly 
invented discipline of Child Study operated in the context of that revolution in humanity’s 
understanding of itself propagated by progressive evolutionism. This context is palpable in 
the specifically progressive model of selfhood which is formulated at the interface between 
the two discourses. The defining features of the child as it is conceptualised in the study of 
language acquisition in both discourses enables a concept of growth as progress, and adult as 
end. The child in both autobiography and Child Study individuates, reflects and validates 
Victorian tenacity to the idea of progressive evolution.   
Psychologists conducted their search for a progressive model of selfhood through 
what Sully, in a characteristically flippant essay entitled ‘Baby Linguistics’ (1884), calls 
‘venerable and learned disputes about the exact relation of speech to thought’.37 Sully 
proposes that these disputes ‘may some day be amicably settled by a reference to that most 
unimpeachable of testimonies, the babblings of infancy’ (p. 111). He is fully aware that this is 
not an entirely ‘fanciful . . . supposition’ (p. 111). The earliest contributions to, and ‘spur’ for, 
Child Study—Darwin’s ‘Biographical Sketch of an Infant’ (1877) and Hippolyte Taine’s ‘On 
the Acquisition of Language by Children’ (1877)—were studies of the child’s acquisition of 
language, and of what that process might say about the relationship between language and 
mind.38 Nearly two decades later, in a major contribution to the now established discipline, 
William Preyer presents his analysis of the development of language in children as a response 
to exactly that question, ‘Is there any thinking without words?’39  
The very title of Preyer’s chapter, ‘Development of the Child’s Intellect 
Independently of Language’, indicates that his answer to the question ‘Is there any thinking 
without words?’ is a definite affirmative.40 The introductory paragraph of the chapter actually 
dismisses the opposite view outright as a ‘prejudice’ which is ‘at least unproved’.41  
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Sully’s view is consistent with Preyer’s. In Studies of Childhood, he argues that: 
 
[t]he growth of a child’s speech means a concurrent progress in the mastery of words and in 
the acquisition of ideas. In this each of the two factors aids the other, the advance of ideas 
pushing the child to new uses of sounds, and the growing facility in word-formation reacting 
powerfully on the ideas, giving them definiteness of outline and fixity of structure.42  
 
In ‘Baby Linguistics’, Sully claims that ‘[l]anguage is the “instrument of thought”’ because a 
word can ‘symbolise a whole class of objects’ (p. 113). Studies of Childhood indicates that 
the instrument in this metaphor is both mechanical and musical. Language helps to produce 
thought, but it also expresses thought which has already taken place.  
Two key points emerge from these studies. Firstly, the child is, by definition, without 
words. Secondly, the child is nevertheless capable of abstract thought. Such a view is entirely 
consonant with what Burnett remembers about her own childhood self. That Small Person is 
also capable of thought, and incapable of articulation. Burnett states that ‘I recognise that [the 
Small Person] was too young to have had in her vocabulary the words to put her thoughts and 
mental arguments into—and yet they were there, as thoughts and mental arguments are there 
today’ (p. 8-9). Similarly, recollecting ‘the first social difficulty of the Small Person’, in 
which she is confronted with ‘the overwhelming problem of how to adjust perfect truth to 
perfect politeness’, Burnett observes that ‘[l]anguage seems required to mentally confront this 
problem’ (p. 10). Although ‘the Small Person cannot have had words’, Burnett insists that it 
is ‘certain that she confronted and wrestled with it’ (p. 10, emphasis added). As in 
foundational texts in the emergent discipline of Child Study, the child in Burnett’s 
autobiography is a mute receptacle for insight. 
This idea of the child’s inarticulate insight reveals the interdependence of ideologies 
of childhood and debates about progressive evolution in the Victorian period. Herbert 
Spencer, a prominent contributor to both debates, encapsulates their co-dependency in the 
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claim that ‘the genesis of knowledge in the individual, must follow the same course as the 
genesis of knowledge in the race’, ‘hence the fundamental reason why education should be a 
repetition of civilization in little’.43 According to Bowler, this theory of recapitulation ‘was 
non-Darwinian in character because it encouraged the belief that evolution shares the 
progressive and teleological character of individual growth’, but ontogeny can only 
recapitulate a teleological phylogeny if childhood is conceived as a primitive stage in the 
progress towards adulthood as a goal and end-point.44 The developmental model of 
progressive species evolution depends on a concept of the child as a narratable origin to a 
stable end.  
When Burnett, Sully and so many others insist that the child has the capacity for 
thought but not for speech, they conceptualise the child in exactly these terms. They present 
the child as a primitive (because pre-linguistic) ancestor to the fully articulate adult. The 
child’s mind is imagined to be at a lesser stage in the progressive development of the human 
self. However, it is also imagined to elude the difficulties which the adult self encounters. 
Coe observes that, in autobiographies of childhood, ‘the use of rational language . . . destroys 
the child’s “intuitive” relationship with the world’, particularly because it ‘creates difference 
between the self and the object’: language is the difference between the adult and the child, 
and between the divided and the coherent self.45 The child’s mind contains an impression of a 
self which is coherent because it is undivided by language.  
This idea that the content of the child mind in some way transcends adult problems is 
clear in the conclusion to Taine’s foundational essay in Child Study, which insists that ‘all the 
shades of emotion, wonder, joy, wilfulness and sadness are expressed by differences of tone’ 
in the child’s ‘twitter’: ‘in this she equals or even surpasses a grown up person’.46 By 
suggesting that the child has superior emotional range, Taine evokes that idea of the child’s 
purer receptiveness or sensitivity to impression which already had such a long history in 
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nineteenth-century literature.47 This marks a small but telling departure from Darwin. Both 
Darwin and Taine associate emotions with the early stages of racial or individual 
development. However, Taine implies that to identify with childish emotion imbues the adult 
with the child’s intuitive insight. Darwin asserts that the human expression of emotion 
supports ‘the conclusion that man is derived from some lower animal form’.48 For Darwin, 
the human expression of emotion is evidence of an animal ancestry which many considered 
debasing. For Taine, the adult expression of emotion is evidence of a childhood which many 
saw as transcendent.  
Thus, when Preyer insists that the child ‘shows plainly . . . [that] long before . . . the 
first successful attempt to express himself in articulate words . . . he combines ideas in a 
logical manner—i. e., he thinks’, he not only insists that the child is capable of thought before 
he is capable of speech, but makes this claim in a context in which what the child thinks is 
seen by many as in some way superior to what the adult thinks.  
Neither Taine nor Preyer refer explicitly to the child’s impression of the self. 
However, the interchange between Child Study and autobiography aligns the objective of the 
former with the self-making function which the latter self-evidently performs. As Gurjeva 
argues, for psychologists ‘the study of children was the study of the inception of the human 
mind.’49 Scientists and authors study the same subject—the child-mind—in response to the 
same problem—the problem of the self in the era of evolution.  
This is emphatically clear in ‘Baby Linguistics’, which concludes with an analysis of 
the relationship between the development of language and of self-consciousness. Sully 
focuses on a child called Clifford, to observe that the process of ‘generalising’, which has 
begun prior to language, is revealed by Clifford’s misapplication of the word ‘papa’ (p. 116) 
to refer to all men. The correction of this error, in ‘the act of distinguishing between his father 
and other men[,] followed rapidly . . . the first use of his own name’ (p. 116). Thus, Clifford’s 
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eventual ability to use the word ‘papa’ correctly ‘clearly involved a dim apprehension of the 
special relation of things to himself’ (p. 116): ‘the recognition of kindred grew out of self-
reflection’ (p. 117). The articulation of perception by the child studied in ‘Baby Linguistics’ 
is analysed in term which equate the development of the child’s language with the 
development of adult selfhood.  
 
The Adult Self as a Progressive Whole 
Child Study defines the child in terms of both its ‘“intuitive” relationship with the world’ and 
its developing language.50 The same characteristics define the representative Small Person of 
The One I Knew the Best of All. Burnett’s text clarifies how this ‘child’, reimagined in the 
emergence of scientific and autobiographical Child Study, invokes a coherent yet progressive 
adult self. The relationship between childhood and selfhood portrayed in The One I Knew the 
Best of All is one in which the adult simultaneously identifies with, and has progressed 
beyond, the child. Burnett can thus identify with the unified child mind, and, by articulating 
that mind, establish her own authorial adult self as the end to the developmental process 
which the child embodies.   
The identity of retrospective adult with insightful child is figured in the Small 
Person’s precociously writerly sensitivity. Burnett wonders ‘[w]hether as impression-creating 
and mind-moulding influences, Literature or the Doll came first into [the Small Person’s] 
life’ (p. 44). Her answer is that:  
 
[i]t is not in the least likely she did not own dolls before she owned books, but it is certain that 
until literature assisted imagination and gave them character, they seemed only things stuffed 
with sawdust and made no special impression. (p. 44) 
 
The Small Person is precociously responsive to story. This reveals that the author, Burnett, is 
latent within, and can therefore retrospectively identify with, that Small Person.  
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However, although Burnett claims that ‘[i]t was not until Literature in the form of 
story, romance, tragedy, and adventure had quickened her imagination that the figure of the 
Doll loomed up in the character of an absorbing interest’ (p. 50), her phrase can be inverted 
in as far as it accounts solely for the Small Person’s experience. That it is story, rather than 
literature or story-in-language, which Burnett identifies as the Small Person’s primary 
interest, is clear when she recalls her frustrated bewilderment that her Nurse could ‘learn a 
couple of verses of a song suggesting a story, and not only neglect to learn more, but neglect 
to inquire about the story itself’ (p. 46). For the child, the language of the song is incidental to 
the story which it serves to communicate.  
The Small Person is thus comparable with, but, crucially, a limited or—to use an 
evolutionary term—primitive form of the adult author. Jenny Bourne Taylor observes that 
The One I Knew the Best of All ‘stress[es] the psychic and social role of play, above all, in the 
creation of miniature worlds.’51 The miniature status of the Small Person’s play, with dolls 
and with stories, connotes its limited, primitive status. The separation Burnett introduces 
between the writing ‘I’ and her diminutive Other self, the ‘Small Person’, likewise implies 
that the adult author has transcended the limitations inherent to the Small Person’s 
miniaturised insight.  
In writing about the Small Person, Burnett is therefore indulging in the same 
‘pleasures of miniaturisation’ which, as Gillian Beer observes, were available to Victorian 
writers through the theory of recapitulation.52 By playing a miniaturised version of adult 
activities, the Small Person in Burnett’s autobiography, and the child in recapitulation theory 
generally, represents a primitive stage in an individuated (or miniaturised) version of 
progressive evolution. In other words, miniaturization, as depicted in the child’s play in 
Burnett’s and so many other autobiographical and scientific studies of childhood, implies 
both ontogenic and phylogenic progress towards the adult human as an end. Burnett’s interest 
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in her miniaturised childhood self is an interest in the miniaturised version of progressive 
evolution offered through recapitulation theory. 
That Burnett is specifically interested in the progressive evolution of her self is clear 
in the moment when the Small Person comes to commit her first story to paper, to make the 
transition from story to story-in-language. This moment is imbued with significance. Burnet 
recalls that she: 
 
felt very still and happy, and as if she wanted to say or do something new, which would 
somehow be an expression of feeling and goodness and—and—she did not know at all what 
else . . . She turned slowly to the exercise-book again . . . A delightful, queer, and 
tremendously bold idea came to her. It was so daring that she smiled a little. ‘I wonder if I 
could write—a piece of poetry’. (p. 194)   
 
The significance of moment gestures towards the ultimate object of Burnett’s ‘record of the 
principal events which influenced the mental life of a Small Person’ (p. 241), which is to 
narrate the development of the Small Person into language and, synonymously, into Frances 
Hodgson Burnett. 
The chapter with which Burnett concludes her autobiography, ‘The First One’, is 
therefore, inevitably, the account of her first publication. The end of Burnett’s story is her 
transition from remembered child into present author. After this transition, Burnett claims 
that the Small Person ‘had crossed the delicate, impalpable dividing line. And after that, Life 
itself began, and memories of her lose the meaning which attaches itself to the memories of 
the Mind of a Child’ (p. 325). The publication of a story in language represents the beginning 
of Burnett herself, and therefore the end of the story which led to that self. The story of the 
child’s progression into language is the story of the development of the self.  
On a species level, language acquisition has similarly profound implications. Darwin 
claims that ‘[w]hether primeval man . . . when his power of language was ex tremely 
imperfect, would have deserved to be called man, must depend on the definition we employ’, 
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and that it is therefore ‘impossible to fix on any definite point when the term “man” ought to 
be used’.53 Language is a sign, if not the defining characteristic, of humanity. Burnett’s 
autobiography allows for no uncertainty on when language is acquired and, thus, on when the 
term ‘adult’ ought to be used. Since the Small Person not only represents any child but, 
through the theory of recapitulation, individuates her species, Burnett’s evolutionism 
counteracts Darwin’s. If the Small Person’s growth is recapitulated in the development of the 
human species, it is entirely possible to fix on the point at which the process of evolution 
reaches its goal in ‘man’. 
Studies of language acquisition are therefore the spur for the invention of Child Study 
during the non-Darwinian revolution, because, as Burnett’s autobiography makes clear, 
language acquisition is the ultimate sign not only of progress, but also of end. Burnett’s 
resolution to the opposition between the childhood self with whom she both identifies, and 
has progressed beyond, is a progressive story of the inarticulate child’s development into an 
adult with language. The theory of recapitulation meant that this story is not only consonant 
with, but actually substantiates, progressive models of species evolution. The One I Knew the 
Best of All is a story of the progressive development of the human race.  
The same story of progressive evolution is implicit in Child Study. At the start of 
‘Baby Linguistics’, Sully observes that ‘scientific fathers have been taking notes of the first 
utterances of their children, with as much care as if they might be expected to contain clear 
reminiscences of that exalted antenatal condition which some philosophers have ascribed to 
the soul’ (p. 111). The conclusion Sully draws from the connection between the child’s 
ability to use his own name and his ability to distinguish his own father from other men 
shows that, once again, the significance Sully places on ‘the babblings of infancy’ is not as 
‘fanciful’ (p. 111) as he first presents it to be. Biographical studies of children like Clifford 
have offered an insight into the relationship between ‘that exalted antenatal condition’ (p. 
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111) which, after Darwin, had to be attributed to the self, and the language which might be 
used to articulate that self. 
As in Burnett’s autobiography, however, that insight is qualified. If the child is 
defined by the absence of language, his insight is inarticulable. The development of 
Clifford’s selfhood is aligned not with any insight into that selfhood which they have as 
inarticulate children, but with the acquisition of language which marks their entry into 
adulthood. This process is much more gradual than in Burnett’s autobiography, but it is 
nevertheless a comparable model for selfhood. Like the Small Person, Clifford emblematises 
the primitive selfhood contained within the child mind. By articulating that mind, the adult 
can retain its unity and coherence, and register her own progress beyond its primitivism. 
That language enables the adult’s identification with and progress beyond the child is 
clear in Sully’s analysis, in Studies of Childhood, of what he describes as the ‘slow and 
irksome business’ of acquiring ‘pronominal forms’.54 Sully suggests that the transition to the 
correct use of pronominal forms, and particularly to the use of first- rather than third-person 
pronouns in referring to the self, ‘seems to be due in part . . . to a growing self-consciousness, 
to a clearer singling out of the ego or self as the centre of thought and activity, and the 
understanding of the other “persons” in relation to this centre’.55 Not, he argues, that: 
 
self-consciousness begins with the use of ‘I’. The child has no doubt a rudimentary self-
consciousness when he talks about himself as about another object: yet the use of the forms 
‘I’, ‘me’ may be taken to mark the greater precision of the idea of ‘self’ as not merely a 
bodily object and nameable thing just like other sensible things, but as something distinct 
from and opposed to all objects of sense, as what we call the ‘subject’ or ego.56  
 
In this discussion of ‘The Little Linguist’ in general, Sully summarises the premise of his 
own analyses of the individual child mind in Clifford’s biography, and the basis of Burnett’s 
autobiography of childhood experience. Greater precision of the idea of the self is constituted 
through the expression of the child mind by the articulate adult who identifies with that child.  
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This same idea is evident in the discussion of childhood, selfhood and language 
offered in the most widely used textbook in psychology during the first decades of the 
twentieth century, Stout’s Manual of Psychology.57 Stout suggests that ‘[s]elf as a whole 
uniting present, past and future phases . . . [is an] ideal construction, built up gradually in the 
course of human development.’58 However, this ‘ideal construction of Self . . . is 
comparatively rudimentary in the lower races of mankind’ (p. 226) because ‘[i]n the case of 
the lower animals and young children, it is impossible, and in the case of savages it is 
difficult, to obtain verbal descriptions of their own mental states and processes . . . partly 
because they either do not use language, or use language inadequate to the purpose’ (p. 21). 
Language is essential for the ‘ideational processes’ through which moments of perception can 
‘unite to form a continuous system, such as is implied in the conception of a person’ (p.266). 
‘Lower races’, and their individuated equivalent, children, are limited to what Stout calls ‘the 
perceptual plane’ (p. 266) as far as they are limited in the linguistic capacities which enable 
ideation.  
 Consequently, for the child ‘there is no single continuous Self contrasted with a single 
continuous world’, because, for as long as the child exists on a purely perceptual plane, the 
construction of Self has ‘never begun’ (p. 266). Stout thus offers the attainment of language 
as the end to the story (or ‘ideational process’ [p. 266], in his words) of the self. His theory of 
selfhood resolves the opposition between the identification with, and Otherness of, the child. 
The adult must both identify with the coherent self of the child-mind, and have progressed 
beyond that child’s primitive inability to use language. To resolve this contradiction in 
Victorian self-making by Burnett, Sully, and Stout, the child-mind is the primitive origin, and 






Darwin’s contribution to natural history propagated a revolutionary debate about humanity in 
the Victorian period. In the standard text for psychology students in the decades following the 
publication of The Origin of the Species, language is the means by which a self-as-end can be 
constructed. The soul, refashioned in an era of evolutionism, is now the expression of the 
remembered insight of the Other, childhood self. In attributing to the child an inarticulate and 
therefore undivided perception of self, the Victorian origins of child psychology create a 
child who is a primitive yet unified ancestor to the adult. The child-mind might contain the 
undivided self, but it is, crucially, differentiated from—and a lower form of—that self. In 
other words, because of what Sully might call a ‘gift of sympathetic insight’ into the child’s 
mind, certain adults—Burnett and other authors of children’s literature prominent among 
them—can identify with the unified self as it existed in the mind of the child.59 By 
articulating that Other, child-self, the adult can progress beyond it, and can thereby attain 
Jameson’s ideal: the self as a progressive whole. 
Autobiography has been recognized as a distinct literary genre ‘since the late 
eighteenth century’.60 That late nineteenth-century revolution in the genre, which produced so 
many works devoted to the recollection and representation of childhood experience, is too 
inextricably associated with Child Study to be recognised in the same terms. Similarly, 
psychology became an established and autonomous discipline during the Victorian period, 
but the affiliated practice of Child Study owed, acknowledged, and even celebrated a debt to 
contemporary autobiographies of childhood experience (and, indeed, to a broad range of 
other accounts of childhood) which must preclude it from disciplinary categorization. 
Victorian Child Study and autobiography of childhood experience are not so much nascent 
branches of psychology and autobiography respectively as they are amalgams, or what might 
now be called interdisciplines, on the theme of childhood. 
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Autobiography of childhood experience and Child Study can thus be understood as 
symbiotic, interdisciplinary studies of the newly necessary idea of selfhood in the Victorian 
period. By formulating specifically progressive model of ontogenic development, these 
discourses offer a self which replicates the most essential quality of the Christian soul, 
namely, the teleology with which it imbues the individual human life. For authors of 
autobiography, and for the psychologists with whom they were contemporary, the story of the 
self is a story of progress from inarticulate Other child to fully coherent adult. Since these 
disciplines studied the child as a miniaturised embodiment of the human species, they can be 
seen as responses to the revolutionary effect of The Origin of the Species. Child Study is 
invented, and autobiography radically reimagined through childhood experience, in the late 
nineteenth century, to substantiate an emphatically non-Darwinian view of human evolution.    
Several questions are raised by this discussion of the connections between 
autobiography, Child Study and evolutionism in the Victorian period. Firstly, Burnett was 
viewed as an expert on children because she wrote literature for children. Jessica Straley has 
shown that a study of children’s literature can inform current understandings of both 
childhood and evolutionism in Victorian discourse, but she honours a long tradition in 
treating children’s literature as a discrete genre.61 If two such seemingly distinct discourses as 
autobiography and psychology are so demonstrably co-dependent when it comes to Victorian 
studies of childhood, the far more dubious boundaries between categories of fiction should 
perhaps be treated with less respect.  
An analysis of literature for children in comparison with canonical and scientific 
literature about children would offer a more fully synthesized picture Victorian debates on 
both childhood and evolution, by eroding anachronistic boundaries between discourses. There 
are, for example, clear continuities between Burnett’s fiction for children and the more 
literary fiction about children written by her contemporary and acquaintance Henry James, 
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and between these disparate fictional works and contemporary psychological studies of the 
child mind.62 The long-respected divide between children’s literature and other literature 
impedes a full analysis of these continuities and, indeed, of the validity of the divide itself. 
Secondly, childhood was only one of many subjects through which ideas about 
evolution were explored and consolidated in the decades following the publication of The 
Origin of Species. Childhood was complexly interrelated with another subject—race—which 
was equally central to Victorian evolutionism: the equivalence Stout invokes, between the 
savage and the child, for example, is ubiquitous in the period.  
This may be because it legitimises a progressive view of the history of human life in 
which the white European adult is the pinnacle and end-point. However, Barbara Larson has 
observed that, ‘[d]espite the significant and expanding literature on Empire and the 
colonies’—including several recent studies of the child in imperial discourse—‘no major 
study has been offered to date on the various strands of evolutionism and how this might 
complicate the representation of race during the Victorian period.’63 Such a study could not 
be conducted without an analysis of the alignment between child and savage which was so 
central to Victorian ideas about race and about evolution.  
This essay has argued that the Victorian origins of child psychology are evident in the 
extent to which ideas about progressive evolution inform emergent scientific and 
autobiographical studies of the child-mind in the period. This invites a broader study of the 
function and significance of childhood and race as co-constructed ideologies in nineteenth-
century scientific, literary and anthropological discourses, and of the dialogue between these 
discourses and contemporaneous debates about the mechanisms for and implications of 
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